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Appellees and Cross-Appellants Longfellow Holdings, LLC, Joan M. Dallof, 
Trustee of the Joan M. Dallof Revocable Trust, Henry S. Hemingway, Trustee of the 
Henry S. Hemingway Revocable Trust, and the Spinnaker Point Condominium Owners 
Association, submit the following closing brief in connection with their cross-appeal of 
the trial court's Order of January 26, 2010, denying their motion for award of costs and 
attorneys'fees herein. (R. 968-971) 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED 
APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS' APPLICATION 
FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEYS'FEES 
Plaintiffs/Appellants/Cross-Appellees B Investment, LC and the Michelle Whitt 
Ortega Trust, like the trial court, have elected in their opposing memorandum to overlook 
the clear and undisputed evidence placed before the court that Plaintiffs' representatives 
openly challenged, and had begun to violate, the Spinnaker Point Condominium Owners 
Association's regulatory authority over the Limited Common Area before this action was 
commenced, necessitating the filing of Spinnaker Point's claims in this matter. Like the 
trial court, Plaintiffs focus exclusively on whether their filing of suit before the trial court, 
in and of itself, triggered the Association's right to recover attorneys' fees under the 
Amended Declaration. For reasons set out more fully in Appellees/Cross-Appellants' 
opening brief, the position of Appellants/Cross-Appellees fails on two distinct, though 
interrelated, grounds. 
As both parties have pointed out, Appellees/Cross-Appellants' right to recover 
costs and attorneys' fees in this matter are granted by contract in the form of language 
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i 
contained in Article XXV of the Amended Declaration. Where there is a contractual 
right to recover attorneys' fees, the scope and extent of that right - like provisions in i 
contracts generally - must be construed according to the plain language of the contract 
used, and applied as a matter of law. See Glenn v. Reese, 2009 UT 80 at If 10, 225 P.3d 
i 
185, 188; see also, Peterson & Simpson v. IHC Health Services, Inc., 2009 UT 54, 217 
P.3d 716; Envirocare of Utah, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 2009 UT 1, 201 P.3d 
982. Again, the Amended Declaration provided the following with respect to attorneys9 
fees: 
Each Unit Owner, tenant, subtenant or other occupant of a Unit shall 
comply with the provisions of the Act, this Declaration, the Bylaws and the 
Rules and Regulations of the Management Committee, all agreements and 
determinations lawfully made and/or entered in to by the Management 
Committee or the Unit Owners, when acting in accordance with their 
authority, and any failure to comply with any of the provisions thereof'shall 
be grounds for an action by the Management Committee or other aggrieved 
party for injunctive relief or to recover any loss or, damage resulting 
therefrom, including costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. 
(Emphasis added) 
In submittals to the trial court, Appellees/Cross-Appellants established - and 
Plaintiffs/Appellants have expressly admitted - that Plaintiffs/Appellants took affirmative 
action in defiance of the provisions of the Amended Declaration as it related to control, 
improvement, or modification of the Limited Common Area marked by the cross-hatched 
pattern on the Amended Plat. In his own Declaration filed with the trial court, 
B Investment, LC General Manager Jean R. Babilis acknowledged the following: 
After B Investment, LC purchased two of the condominium units at 
Spinnaiker Point, I attended formal meetings of the home owners 
association and had discussions with Mr. Dallof as well as the other lot 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
owners regarding the use and ownership of the Limited Common Area 
shown on the amended Spinnaker Point plat. On the several occasions, I 
informed Mr. Dallof and the other owners that, as provided by the amended 
plat and Utah law, the ownership of Lot 2 resides with the owners of the 
condominiums located on Lot 2. I also told Mr. Dallof and the others that 
the rights of lot owners in the Limited Common Area shown by the 
amended plat on Lot 2 was for access and use of the beach 
Lot 2 is owned by the condominium unit owners located on Lot 2. 
Consequently, consistent with the right of ownership enjoyed by all of the 
lot owners', I have planted trees and made landscaping improvements on 
Lot 2. I also planned to improve the topsoil, add sprinkling, and make 
other improvements to Lot 2 consistent with the desire of the owners of the 
condominium units. Because the residential owners do not own any of the 
condominium units and are not part of the condominium project on Lot 2,1 
do not believe that they can dictate what landscaping improvements are 
made on Lot 2 by the condominium owners, any more than the 
condominium owners could dictate what improvements are made on the 
residential lots. . . . 
I attended a home owners association meeting and informed the other 
owners of my plans regarding landscaping on Lot 2. As I indicated to the 
other owners, the soil on the east facing slope of the lot is very poor and 
will not hold water so it is impossible to keep the grass green and growing 
in the hot summer. I told the single family lot owners of our plans to add 
new topsoil that would better retain water on the slope and a new sprinkling 
system. I also told the single lot owners of our plans to add decorative 
landscaping on Lot 2, consistent with the landscaping that each of the 
single family lot owners had done with their own lots. . . . 
/ have not completed most of the improvements as a result of lack of time, 
but I intend to do so next season. None of the planned improvements will 
restrict, in any way, the use of the i(Limited Common Ownership area,J for 
access to and use of the beach. . . . 
(R. 656-665; emphasis added.) By open admission of its Managing Member, in other 
words, Appellant/Cross-Appellee B Investment, LC's managing member stated - not 
once but several times - that he believed the Spinnaker Point management committee to 
have no right to dictate development on Lot 2 (including the "Limited Common Area") 
any more than the owners of the condominium units on Lot 2 had the right to dictate 
O-7/iOOC 1 
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improvement and development on the individual residential lots. Mr. Babilis further 
admitted on the record of the Court that, before Spinnaker Point took action to stop him, < 
he acted on his belief, planting trees and performing improvements and modifications on 
Lot 2 without submitting plans to the management committee or otherwise complying 
with the requirements of the Amended Declaration. When challenged concerning their 
conduct, Appellants/Cross-Appellees did not desist from their words or conduct, but filed 
suit to establish rights over the Limited Common Area which permitted their past and 
future disregard of the Association's authority over them, forcing Spinnaker Point to 
petition for declaratory and injunctive relief. 
The trial court permanently enjoined Appellants/Cross-Appellees from acting 
contrary to the requirements of the Amended Declaration, yet focused only on their last 
step in this regard: the petitioning of the trial court for declaratory relief. No twisting of 
the facts, however, can frame Appellants/Cross-Appellees' conduct as anything less than 
a "failure to comply with [the] provisions [of the Amended Declaration]." No creative 
interpretation of the express and plain language of Article XXV of the Amended 
Declaration, by the same token, can exclude Appellants/Cross-Appellees' conduct from 
the operation thereof. Appellants/Cross-Appellees declared their belief that the Amended 
Declaration did not govern their control and development of the Limited Common Area; 
they voiced their intent to disregard the requirements of the Amended Declaration in 
pursuit of development of that property; and they commenced action in accordance with 
their declaration. The fact that Plaintiffs/Appellants/Cross-Appellees were first to the 
courthouse, such that Spinnaker Points' petition for declaratory and injunctive relief arose 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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by way of counterclaim, does not change the nature of the action which Spinnaker Point 
was required to take to prevent further abuses by Appellants/Cross-Appellees, nor that 
Spinnaker Point was successful in doing so before the trial court. Accordingly, attorneys' 
fees should be awarded under the express language of the Amended Declaration. 
Appellants/Cross-Appellees cite to the decision of Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth 
Corp., 2009 UT 2,201 P.3d 966 in support of their claim that no attorneys' fees should 
have been awarded in this matter. The Giusti, decision, however, dealt with a provision 
awarding attorney fees against "the defaulting party" in an employment agreement. The 
parties to the action expressly agreed that there was no "defaulting party" in that action, 
accordingly, no fees were warranted under the agreement. In this action, by contrast. 
Appellants/Cross-Appellees not only acknowledge, but openly adduce evidence 
establishing, that they engaged in conduct amounting to "failure to comply with [the] 
provisions [of the Amended Declaration]," thus triggering the contractual right of fee 
recovery under Article XXV. 
Even disregarding Plaintiffs' pre-litigation conduct, though, the filing of this 
action coupled with the outcome before the trial court - dismissal of that portion of the 
complaint dealing with the Limited Common Area, and the granting of both the 
declaratory and the injunctive relief prayed in the Counterclaim - dictate an award of 
fees. In the case of Terry Terrace Condominium Owners Association v. Terry Wallace 
Apartments, LLC, 159 Wash. App. 1018, 2011 WL 135232, the Washington Court of 
Appeals considered, as a matter of first impression, an application for attorneys' fees by 
the home owners' association in a dispute with the prior owner of the apartment building 
5 
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4 
before condominiumization thereof, which dealt with the parties' respective rights to pre-
sale rents of the building rooftop to a cable telecommunications company. The trial court 
found for the HO A, and awarded attorney fees under RCW 64.34.455, which provides 
that 
"If a declarant or any other person subject to this chapter fails to 
comply with any provision hereof or any provisions of the 
declaration or bylaws, any person or class of persons adversely 
affected by the failure to comply has a claim for appropriate relief. 
The court, in an appropriate case, may award reasonable attorneys' 
fees to the prevailing party. " 
On appeal, the prior owner disputed the propriety of attorneys' fees, arguing (precisely as 
do Appellants/Cross-Appellees here) that "this lawsuit deals with an interpretation of the 
Condominium Act rather than willful violation of the Act." The Washington Court of 
Appeals, though, upheld the award as necessary, under the circumstances, to put the 
HO A "in as good a position as if the other party had fully performed," as required by 
Washington's Condominium Ownership Act. 
Spinnaker Point's rights in this matter arise by contract rather than statute; 
however, the rationale of the Terry Terrace decision is equally appropriate. Appellants/ 
Cross-Appellees elected to challenge the interpretation of the Amended Declaration by 
legal action (in addition to self-help, as described above), forcing Spinnaker Point to seek 
the precise relief described in Article XXV. Appellees/Cross-Appellants prevailed; their 
interpretation of the Declaration was properly adopted, and Appellants/Cross-Appellees 
were permanently enjoined from doing what they threatened, and had commenced, on the 
Limited Common Area. The goal of the law in affording contractual relief is precisely 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the same as that stated in Washington's Condominium Act: to put the aggrieved party in 
the same position which it would have occupied absent breach by the opposing party -
see Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104, 990 P. 2d 933. Even without Appellant/Cross-
Appellees' prior acts, their filing of suit herein mandated the incurrence of costs and fees, 
and Article XXV should be applied to put Spinnaker Point back where it should be. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set out in their prior brief, Appellees/ 
Cross-Appellants submit that the trial court had before it undisputed evidence that 
Plaintiffs/Appellants/Cross-Appellees were failing to comply with the development 
requirements imposed by the Amended Declaration based on their express belief that Lot 
2 was theirs and theirs alone, and had actually begun to act on that belief when this action 
commenced; accordingly, under Article XXV of the Amended Declaration, costs and 
attorneys' fees should have been awarded as a matter of law. 
DATED this 25th day of April, 2011. 
JONES WALDO H^LBROOK & McDONOUGH PC 
*y AS^T 
>^^Vincent C. Rampton 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees/ 
Cross-Appellants 
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